Report | Digital Defense Initiative | Asymmetries and Power

Techno-authoritarianism: what does the “parallel Abin” tell us about surveillance mechanisms and democracy?

Earlier this year, the confirmation of suspicions of the existence of a parallel Abin through investigations by the Federal Police added to the bitter taste of the legacy of Bolsonarism. According to the investigations, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) was allegedly used illegally to spy on politicians, journalists, and authorities opposed to the government of Jair Bolsonaro, with the intention of favoring the former president’s clan.

The Supreme Court justices Gilmar Mendes and Alexandre de Moraes, the former president of the Chamber of Deputies Rodrigo Maia, and the former governor of Ceará and current Minister of Education Camilo Santana were among the authorities who were victims of the criminal monitoring scheme. The institution’s parallel operations were carried out through the use of the Israeli software First Mile.

The Federal Police carried out operations against Alexandre Ramagem (PL-RJ) and Carlos Bolsonaro, where they found evidence of the agency obtaining illegal “materials” as a result of criminal monitoring. According to the investigations, the former president’s son was the one who headed the political espionage group without the approval of the courts, political opponents, authorities, and journalists. The PF already had evidence that Jair Bolsonaro was one of those who benefited from information from the illegal espionage scheme.

The revelations bring into focus the issue of the agency’s clandestine activities during Bolsonaro’s government and raise serious concerns about the criminal use of a public institution and surveillance devices by far-right governments to control and access privileged information and personal favors. And this also has implications for the collective security of the Brazilian population. Researcher Vinícius Fernandes da Silva from the Data Privacy Brazil Research Association talks a little more about these impacts.

Escola de Ativismo: Is there anything new in the clandestine activities of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) during the Bolsonaro government? How does this impact the collective security and privacy of activists?

Vinícius Fernandes da Silva: Yes and no. Let’s go. Abin was created in 1999, being the direct successor of the National Intelligence Service (SNI), the agency responsible for the information that guided the dictatorship’s repression of militants, activists, political parties, unions, the media, and the church, among others. Therefore, Abin inherited the know-how, the modus operandi of SNI, largely due to the way in which the redemocratization process was overseen by the military, with no rupture but rather continuity. Same instructors, the same playbook, reproducing the same logic. After the return to democracy, it has already been used for political purposes, as in the case of 2002 with allegations that Abin agents participated in an operation that led to the withdrawal of the former governor of Maranhão, Roseana Sarney, from the race for the Presidency of the Republic. We also had a case revealed in 2008 with wiretaps by the agency on some members of parliament, in which Abin denied participation but led to the removal of the agency’s top brass.

However, in this recent case involving the Bolsonaro government, the evidence is irrefutable. Abin, through contract 567/2018, of a confidential nature, used the surveillance tool from December 26, 2018, to May 8, 2021, monitoring, according to allegations, political opponents, activists, senators, the governor, and even a minister of the Supreme Federal Court (STF). In today’s information society, the use of these surveillance tools, in this case First Mile, which can monitor up to 10,000 cell phone owners in real time every 12 months, creates enormous insecurity regarding activists’ privacy.

EA: What does this tell us about the state of surveillance against society and social movements in the world today?

VFS: With constant technological evolution, the technical and instrumental capacity of the state to exercise its legitimate use of force increases. As a result, actions in anomie zones, characterized by places where rights are absent, increase the damage to the Democratic Rule of Law. In other words, technology outside democratic rules will perpetuate acts of structural violence within the patriarchal and Eurocentric dynamics of the world.

Since the Snowden case in 2013, when the former employee of the National Security Agency (NSA) revealed documents from the agency and the CIA about the mass spying on US citizens, in addition to the interception of private conversations of world leaders of the time, such as Dilma Rousseff and Angela Merkel, technology has expanded the power of the state.

The company that owns the spy technology, Cognyte (formerly Verint), is not by chance an Israeli company, belonging to a militarized state, testing its surveillance tools against the Palestinian people. The Brazilian army is the largest buyer of the technology in the country, spending more than 82 million reais between 2014 and 2023.

In Latin American countries, with a recent history of military dictatorships, we are even more concerned about the legacy of the state acting outside the rules with the justification of the public security of “good” men.

EA: What is the role of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) in controlling and supervising intelligence activities, especially in cases of illegal espionage?

VFS: As already decided by the STF, Abin’s intelligence activities do not operate in the field of exception to fundamental rights. On the contrary, the activities are subject to the rules of the Democratic State of Law and respect for fundamental rights (ADPF 695). Therefore, the actions described by Abin Paralela are illegal and must be judged according to the law.

Recently, the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) challenged the STF through the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission (ADO 84), suggesting that the Court dictate rules to be followed until there is a specific regulation on the subject. The PGR understands that there is a constitutional gap in the regulation of the issue, so it has called on the STF to ensure provisional guidelines for safeguarding the fundamental rights to intimacy and privacy and the inviolability of the secrecy of personal communications and data, until Congress plays its role in legislating on the subject.

The ADO’s latest move, Minister Cristiano Zanin, the rapporteur of the case, has set a ten-day deadline (starting on 02/02) for the National Congress to provide information on the regulation of the use of surveillance tools. This is a standard measure, but it shows the interest in the speedy processing of the matter in the Court.

EA: How can the use of information obtained illegally by Abin have an impact on the integrity of democratic processes and political relations in Brazil? How does this impact the defense of Brazilian democracy?

VFS: We will still know better as the information progresses the extent of the impact of Abin Paralela. The first reports, such as the one published in a TV Band report, show a list with at least 21 names, citing deputies, senators from the Covid CPI, former Bolsonaro supporters, former governors, and ministers of the STF.

On this list, there are nine senators who were part of the Covid CPI, among them the chairman of the committee, Omar Aziz (PSD-AM), and the rapporteur, Renan Calheiros (MDB-AL). Another member of the CPI who was allegedly spied on is Randolfe Rodrigues (no party-AP), leader of the government in Congress. In addition to the former governor of São Paulo, João Doria, among others.

The political nature of the action demonstrates the use of state tools beyond the rules of the democratic game, exposing the use of public space to maintain power. The necessary measures must be taken; we cannot accept new impunity or amnesties.

EA: What are the main surveillance mechanisms used today by the far right to monitor journalists, politicians, and authorities, as indicated by the ongoing investigation?

VFS: First Mile is yet another of the many technologies used in an invasive manner by the state. Through the project Defending Brazil from Techno-authoritarianism, the Data Privacy Brazil Research Association observed the use of several tools and techniques by the public authorities, such as:

Excel Project, the project was established by Ordinance No. 26/2020, Secretariat of Integrated Operations/SEOPI, aiming to enable the sharing of data from the State Public Security Secretariats with the Intelligence Directorate/DINT to generate a database focused on developing public security intelligence. Data, together with other civil society entities, sent a letter to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office about the case;

Harpia Tech and Pegasus, both technologies, aim at greater surveillance of citizens by enabling the collection, cross-referencing, and analysis of personal data, which can generate detailed profiles. They represent a clear example of espionage software, with SEOPI leading the acquisition process for both. The case was analyzed by the TCU, which, however, did not prevent the contracting.

Cortex, a system used by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency that allows access to highway cameras and monitoring of people. Learn more about Data’s work with civil society in relation to the MPF here.

Citizen Base Registry, use of a decree to facilitate interoperability within public systems, including intelligence services. Decree 10.046/2019 disregards personal data protection standards and posed a risk to the population due to the lack of procedures for data processing. The case was analyzed in a joint trial of ADI 6649 and ADPF 695, becoming an emblematic case within the discipline of personal data protection.

EA: In your view, is there a global trend of far-right governments using intelligence agencies to achieve their political objectives? We have seen this, especially in the US, where we use mass espionage to monitor not only the American population but others.

VFS: Yes, we have several examples of First Mile being used around the world, and it has a documented history of transparency in human rights. There are records of the use of technologies for surveillance and violation of the rights of opponents in Sudan, and in Myanmar, the systems were implicated in an incident that led to the arrest of more than 12,000 people and the murder of 1,600 people.

EA: How can civil society protect itself against possible abuses of surveillance and illegal espionage by the State?

VFS: Civil society should push for the regulation of intelligence tools within the fundamental rights of citizens to be protected. We should promote a networked environment to strengthen civil society training and provide guidance on best practices for protecting and preserving this democratically conquered space. We should influence public authorities to create a system of checks and balances where the three branches of government (Executive, legislative, and judicial) have autonomy to perform their functions, but with external control from the other branches, always in a context of accountability. Citizen control should also be part of this narrative, promoting the participation of third-party organizations, academia, and activists in transparency mechanisms and effective dialogue with other public institutions.

EA: What are the recommended measures to strengthen transparency and accountability in intelligence agencies, aiming to prevent illegal espionage practices and ensure respect for individual rights?

VFS: A clear and objective regulatory design is needed that determines in law the rules for the use of these tools, based on article 5 of the Constitution, on individual and collective rights and duties, Law No. 9,296, of July 24, 1996, on telephone interceptions, and Law No. 9,883, of December 7, 1999, which institutes the Brazilian Intelligence System and creates the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin).

All police activity must be protected by the pertinent legal authorization, observing discretion, due legal order, and the protection of sensitive data within fundamental rights.

*Vinícius Fernandes da Silva has a degree in public policy management and a master’s degree in social change and political participation from USP, working on topics related to democracy, public safety, and the arts.

Text written by Luiza Ferreira and originally published on 29.02.2024 on the Escola de Ativismo website.