The event largely reproduced patterns seen in previous editions: low levels of institutionalization, limited clarity on implementation pathways, and final declarations without binding commitments. The Summit maintained a fragmented approach, with discussions continuing to prioritize innovation and future risks over the pressing structural needs of the Global South.

Beyond these substantive imbalances, a major shortcoming of the Summit was the limited space for meaningful participation by civil society and academic institutions from the Global South. Despite the references to multistakeholderism, no structured mechanisms ensured that civil society contributions would inform the negotiated texts or outcomes. Ahead of the Summit, the Global South Alliance (GSA) sent a letter advocating for stronger and more institutionalized participation, yet these recommendations were not reflected in the Summit’s approach.

On the other hand, the AI Impact Summit was dominated by a focus on government-Big Tech partnerships and industrial policy, framed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ambition to use AI to “supercharge” economic growth. This corporate-government synergy was on full display as tech giants used the platform to showcase strategic investments aimed at the Global South, featuring headline-grabbing commitments like Google’s $15 billion and Microsoft’s $17.5 billion for AI infrastructure. The event’s industrial policy focus was further underscored by India’s creation of substantial tax incentives for datacenters, coupled with a notable distance from global AI governance discussions as star leaders like Sam Altman and Sundar Pichai dominated local media narratives. Also, the broader geopolitical context was set by the US-India “Pax Silica” technology agreement, which strengthens ties between India and US tech companies.

Amid this scenario, some stakeholders pushed the discussion towards a global governance of AI, as Brazil, which sent an extensive delegation to the summit. In his speech, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was firm in highlighting the risks associated with the use of AI systems, such as autonomous weapons, hate speech, disinformation, violence against women and girls and other threats to democracies. Brazil also referred to existing governance initiatives, emphasizing the UN’s role as the main center for AI governance, especially through initiatives defined in the Global Digital Compact, such as the International Independent Scientific Panel on AI. The speech also nodded to other fora, mentioning the 2025 BRICS declaration on AI, from Brazil’s presidency, which also recognizes the UN’s coordinating role in this sphere, warning that without collective action, AI will deepen historical inequalities, as computational capabilities and data remain concentrated in a few actors.

The event’s final Declaration is predictable, in line with what was already expected in terms of a lack of concreteness and more effective commitments among countries. The document presents itself as reflecting the views of participants from countries and international organizations, and even highlights the importance of multistakeholder engagement, something that contradicts the very organization of the Summit. By citing only a few examples of existing non-binding initiatives, the Declaration fails even to acknowledge the outcomes of working groups created within its own framework, such as the security group co-chaired by Brazil and Japan. The document also emphasizes respect for national sovereignty, a strong hallmark of the Indian government throughout the week of the event and, naturally, of its technology-related policies.

The next AI Summit is scheduled to take place in 2027 in Switzerland, as announced at the event by Swiss Ambassador Thomas Schneider. His remarks struck a more optimistic tone regarding stakeholder inclusion and coordination with existing initiatives in other multilateral fora. Moreover, Switzerland has already signaled a more concrete intention to work toward binding conventions, such as the Vilnius Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, of the Council of Europe (the first-ever international legally binding treaty in this field). Expectations are that the Convention may be expanded to additional countries, fostering a shared and interoperable vision while still allowing for coexistence with each country’s own regulatory frameworks.

With 2026 only just beginning, and with expectations surrounding “new AI governance spaces” such as the UN Independent Scientific Panel and the UN Global Dialogue, there is hope that these processes will help strengthen a multilateralism that is currently weakened, and enable truly multistakeholder participation on equal footing, where Human Rights, and not only industrial policy, are prioritized. With leading countries like the United States against a global governance framework within the United Nations, the challenge will continue, and expectations will grow to “alternative countries” like India, Brazil and Switzerland, that, despite not having great AI power, try to strengthen frameworks of governance and regulation to level the playing field.

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